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Climate Change is arguably the single most important 
issue of our lifetime. It could affect each and every 
human being on our planet, irrespective of his or her 
country of residence, income level, race or color. While 
a universal agreement within the scientific community 
has yet to be reached, there is certainly a broad con-
sensus by now that the earth is indeed undergoing an 
unprecedented rise in global temperature as well as 
unusual changes in weather patterns. Furthermore, it is 
agreed that these changes are most likely the result of 
human activity, and that unless this temperature rise is 
arrested soon, the world as we know it today will face 
catastrophic consequences.
The global community, including the political and 
policy leaders of the highest level, has been debating 
this issue for years and has held a number of summits 
organized by the United Nations. The last Summit was 
held in Copenhagen in December 2009, and despite the 
high hopes of many and the organizers’ best efforts, a 
concrete and binding agreement has so far eluded the 
global community. A major reason behind the current 
impasse appears to be the still wide divide between 
the perspectives of the so-called Annex I (developed 
economy) countries listed in the Kyoto Protocol and 
the major emerging markets economies. And yet, the 
experts still continue to warn us all that urgent action is 
absolutely essential.
Many prominent participants of the Emerging Market 
Forum (EMF) are dismayed by this impasse. They have 
urged the Forum to make an attempt to help bridge 
the current wide gulf between the perspectives of the 
developed and developing countries. While we are keen 
to respond to this request, we are also very aware of the 
fact that tens of hundreds of highly qualified and well 
meaning institutions—both public and private—have 
already produced many outstanding studies and are 
actively engaged in the ongoing global negotiations on 
climate change. Therefore, the question we faced was 
where and how we can add value.
The answer to this question lay in four unique 
features of the EMF. First, our Forum was created 
exclusively to debate and tackle major long term issues 
of direct concern to the emerging market economies. 
Second, the Forum considers and attempts to address 
the issues from the perspective of the emerging markets 
economies. Third, the Forum is ideologically neutral and 
has no institutional agenda. It commissions analyses by 
world-class experts who have no personal agenda or 
ideology. And fourth, the Forum brings together high-
level policy makers, senior most executives of multilateral 
institutions and top business executives, and provides 
them with an opportunity to discuss the issues in an inti-
mate and informal setting. In our view, these features of 
the EMF make it uniquely qualified to provide a platform 
to discuss climate change and to consider what is truly 
in the best interest of the emerging market countries, 
well away from the pressures associated the global 
negotiations.
To provide our participants with a different per-
spective than they may have encountered before, 
we commissioned Vivid Economics to prepare fresh 
analysis that looks at climate change primarily from the 
economic and social viewpoint of the emerging markets 
economies. Vivid will be producing their analysis in 
phases. Under Phase I, they were asked to look at the 
economic “self interest” of the emerging markets under 
three scenarios: a) a do nothing scenario—also called 
the business as usual approach—under which the 
current trends in climate change go unchecked for the 
next 40 years; b) a scenario under which the developed 
countries (Annex I countries listed in the Kyoto Protocol) 
take steps to reduce their emissions by 80% over the 
1995 levels by the end of 2050; and c) a third scenario 
under which the major emerging market economies 
(defined as members of the G-20) take parallel actions 
to restrain their emissions by 2050 to the same levels 
as their 2005 emissions (as proposed by China in 
Copenhagen). This Phase I report provides an overview 
of the effects of global warming based on the actions 
under each of these three scenarios. It then goes on to 
estimate the economic implications of each scenario on 




on agriculture production), with specific references to the 
impact on the three largest: China, Brazil and India. 
This report will be followed up by the Phase II report, 
which will look at the economic implications of climate 
change on China, Brazil and India in more detail. We 
believe that this country level analysis, done in a consist-
ent manner across countries, is essential because, in the 
end, each country must first determine what is in its own 
self interest, before deciding how to participate in the 
global efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
I believe that the enclosed paper offers fascinating 
new insights as to whether remedial measures taken by 
Annex I countries alone would be adequate to mitigate 
the most adverse affects of climate change on the 
emerging market or, if instead, they must take aggres-
sive proactive actions on their own out of sheer self 
interest (rather than in response to the outside pressures 
from the developed countries).
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ment throughput the conception and execution of this 
work.
I do hope that the participants at the forthcoming 
EMF meeting will find this document as stimulating and 
thought provoking as my colleagues at EMF and I did.
Harinder Kohli
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Executive Summary
Continued fossil fuel-driven growth could leave Earth 
around 4.9°C warmer in 2100 than in 1990 and sea 
levels 0.5m higher. This would have extremely damaging 
implications for G20 Emerging Markets (GEMs),1 with 
economic damages possibly causing annual GDP to be 
6.0% lower than it otherwise would be by 2100. The last 
time global temperatures were this high — the Eocene 
period, 35-55 million years ago — swampy forests cov-
ered much of the world and there were alligators near 
the North Pole.
Even with ambitious action by Annex 1 countries,2 
GEMs will still experience most of the damaging conse-
quences of climate change. If Annex 1 countries reduce 
their emissions by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050, tem-
perature increases over 1990 levels might still be 4.4°C 
in 2100, because over the next decades the GEMs will 
contribute the lion’s share of global emissions growth.
For GEMs to avoid the damaging consequences 
of climate change, they must take ambitious action 
alongside Annex 1 countries. GEMs are now responsible 
for roughly the same amount of emissions as the G20 
Annex 1 countries. China has replaced the US as the 
world’s largest emitter. Rapid economic growth to 2050 
coupled with population growth implies GEMs will con-
tribute most to future emissions. While Annex 1 coun-
tries have contributed the most to historic emissions, it is 
the GEMs that are expected to be responsible for much 
of the future warming of the planet. They can control 
their own destiny – and that of the planet.  
If GEMs restrain their emissions to 2005 levels by 
2050, and reduce emissions from deforestation by 50 
per cent, temperature increases from 1990 levels may 
be limited to 2.7°C. This would avoid some of the worst 
impacts. The modelling analysis in this report employs 
the MAGICC climate model, one of the models used in 
the latest IPCC report, the RICE damages model created 
1  Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, South Africa and 
Turkey.
2  Defined as an 80% reduction on 1990 levels by 2050 (and no change in 
land use change emissions), emissions constant thereafter.
by Professor Nordhaus at Yale University, as well as 
analysis based on agricultural models and the GLOBIO3 
model of biodiversity losses. The report examines three 
core scenarios: (i) business-as-usual, (ii) action by Annex 
1 countries and (iii) action by both Annex 1 and the 
GEMs. Results are shown in Table 1.
A significant proportion of the benefits generated 
by GEM action are the result of China, India and Brazil 
controlling their emissions. If these three GEMs alone 
were to take action then temperature increases may be 
restricted to around 3.5°C above 1990 levels. This would 
reduce the damages experienced by these countries. 
China’s losses are estimated at 2.2% of 2100 GDP, 
compared with 3.2% if no GEMs act, and India’s losses 
at 4.2% of GDP, compared to 5.9% without any GEM 
action. 
Regardless of whether some or all GEMs act, these 
temperature increases would still be likely to have 
serious consequences. Many scientists regard a 2°C 
increase as a maximum before the risks of dangerous 
climate change become unacceptable. This position is 
recognised in the Copenhagen Accord.  Limiting tem-
perature increases to 2°C on pre-industrial levels would 
require more ambitious action by GEMs, Annex 1 and 
also the rest of the world. 
Given this, it is unsurprising that GEMs have already 
begun to take action. There has already been a rapid 
and pronounced acceleration in low-carbon innovation 
activity within the GEMs. China, for instance, is now 
one of the leading countries in the world in solar, wind 
and nuclear power, electric cars, and high-speed rail 
technologies. Brazil has launched a sophisticated real-
time deforestation tracking mechanism and committed 
to reducing deforestation. India’s eleventh five year 
plan (2008-2012) includes measures aiming to increase 
energy efficiency by 20 percentage points by 2016-17. 
South Korea and Mexico have put in place absolute 
emission targets,3 and it is likely that several GEMs will 
3  Although neither target is reported in Appendix II of the Copengahen 
Accord, South Korea has made a voluntary unilateral pledge to reduce emissions by 4% 
on 2005 levels by 2020 while Mexico has an aspirational target of reducing emissions 
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beat the USA to the introduction of carbon pricing. 
Current policies are not enough, however. 
Accelerated action could trigger a low-carbon race that 
the GEMs are well positioned to win. As well as reduc-
ing the climate damages GEMs may face, coordinated 
GEM action could prompt Annex 1 countries to ramp 
up their emission reductions, providing larger markets 
for GEM low-carbon products. For instance, a recent 
HSBC report predicted that if governments went 
beyond the commitments they made during the run up 
to COP 15 then, even by 2020, the low-carbon market 
would be worth 2.7 trillion US dollars; 30% larger than if 
by 50% from 2002 levels by 2050. In Appendix II to the Copenhagen Accord South 
Africa also reports that its plans will involve emissions peaking between 2020 and 2025, 
plateauing for approximately a decade and thereafter declining.
governments simply kept to their COP 15 commitments 
and 100% larger than in their worst-case scenario. 
There is also an opportunity for the GEMs to change 
the economic and political status quo. Significant 
technological changes in fundamental technologies 
have sometimes been associated with countries (or 
firms in those countries) ‘leap-frogging’ their counter-
parts, for example when Great Britain leapfrogged The 
Netherlands during the Industrial Revolution, or when the 
US overtook Great Britain through the adoption of mass 
market production technologies. 
There are costs to the transition, but the costs only 
increase with delay. Fossil fuel intensive growth implies 
the construction of new, dirty capital stock which is 






country & GEM 
action
Average global temperature increase in 
2100 (on 1990 levels), °C 4.9 4.4 2.7
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2, parts 
per million 905 780 550
Economic damages 
in 2100, % of GDP:
GEMs -6.0 -5.1 -2.5
India -7.0 -5.9 -3.0
China -3.9 -3.2 -1.5
Agricultural yield 
declines in 2050 
relative to 2000,%:
Argentina -19.8 -15.8 -6.2
Brazil -22.2 -18.5 -7.3
China 8.9 9.1 7.2
India -14.1 -11.4 -10.7
Indonesia -20.5 -19.9 -12.9
Mexico -0.7 -0.6 -0.2
Republic of Korea -18.5 -18.0 -11.7
South Africa -5.6 -5.8 -4.0
Turkey -0.7 0.3 -3.1
Sea level rise in 2100, cm above 1990 
levels 50.5 45.6 32.1
Decline in biodiversity, km2 pristine area 
equivalent loss 1990-2050  2,509,000 2,253,000 1,754,000
Source: Vivid Economics based on sources in text
Action by GEM governments is essential if their countries are 
to avoid the worse consequences of climate change



































































dirty production is accounted for. Early action will also 
speed up the rate of technical progress in low-carbon 
technologies. Both these factors mean that starting early 
can allow for a more gradual and planned, and hence 
less costly, transition. For instance if GEMs start taking 
action in 2012 to bring emissions back to 2005 levels 
by 2050 (a potential proposal of China, as reported by 
the Sustainability Institute (2010)) then they would only 
have to achieve annual reductions in emissions of 0.4% 
per annum. If they wait until 2030 before starting to take 
action (a typical ‘delayed action’ starting point), with the 
intention of reaching the same target by 2070, then aver-
age reductions of 1.5% per annum might be required. 
While historical experience shows that reductions of 
0.5% per annum are achievable without significant 
economic consequences, reductions of more than 
1.0% per annum have typically only been associated 
with prolonged economic recessions. All in all, research 
suggests that costs to emerging economies could be 
between 25% and 33% lower with early action.
Post transition, GEMs will have more secure energy 
supplies. Currently, six of the nine GEMs are reliant on 
imports for more than 20% of their total energy require-
ments. Fossil fuels provide a small number of countries 
with disproportionate economic and geopolitical power. 
In contrast, many low-carbon energy resources (solar, 
wind, hydro, nuclear, biomass, geothermal) are more 
readily available in GEM countries. 
GEMs will also be healthier and more efficient. Of the 
ten cities with the worst air pollution in the world, nine 
are in GEM countries. Fossil fuel combustion is largely to 
blame for the adverse health consequences for the 50 
million people who live in these cities; each year in China 
alone air pollution is thought to cause 270,0000 cases 
of chronic bronchitis and 400,000 hospital admissions 
for respiratory or cardiovascular disease. Air pollution 
problems are also due to cause an additional $6-10 bil-
lion p.a. in crop yield losses in India and China by 2030. 
These problems are sufficiently great, and alleviating 
them so important, that one study has suggested that 
reducing emissions by 15% through a carbon price 
in China would be desirable on these grounds alone. 
Moreover, there is the possibility for GEMs to implement 
measures that both reduce emissions and generate effi-
ciency savings of at least USD 100 billion per annum.  
This report suggests that some or all GEMs could 
seize the climate policy agenda, and open up these 
broader opportunities, with a co-ordinated, self-
interested announcement to exploit the fear of “losing 
the low-carbon race” in the West. Such a strategy would 
likely thwart resistance within Annex 1 countries to 
action on climate change, which would be to the benefit 
of GEMs. Irrespective of Annex 1 action, however, 
without early action by the GEMs, they themselves risk 
bearing the impacts of dangerous climate change.
Introduction
This report examines the economic and strategic impli-
cations for the G20 Emerging Markets (or GEMs) of cli-
mate change. Building on the work of the Stern Review, 
which found that the global benefits of taking action to 
prevent climate change, and the risks associated with 
failure to act, outweighed the global costs of action, this 
report addresses similar themes but with explicit focus 
on the GEMs.4 New modelling examines the benefits if 
GEMs take early action and the risks and costs if they 
fail to act. While the GEMs have already undertaken 
action against climate change to varying degrees, it is 
found that accelerating these initiatives will yield further 
economic and social benefits for themselves and the 
world as a whole. 
The GEMs are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. 
These are the G20 countries that do not have legally 
binding commitments to reduce emissions under Annex 
B of the Kyoto Protocol5 and that, in 1990, the base year 
4  Although many of the themes covered in this report are similar to those 
covered in the Stern review but with a focus on the GEMs, it has been conducted with 
much more limited resources and over a much shorter timeframe, so more detailed work 
on the GEMs remains necessary. As such, three more in depth country reports on China, 
India and Brazil will follow this report in 2011.
5  Despite the common reference to Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries 
in discussing the Kyoto Protocol, it is countries listed in Annex B that have emission 

































































for the Kyoto Protocol, had a Gross National Income (on 
an international dollar Purchasing Power Parity basis) of 
less than USD 9,000 per capita. All of the other coun-
tries of the G20 had a higher GNI per capita in this year.
The report is structured as follows:  
•	 Section 2 sets out three future scenarios for the 
world’s climate, depending on which groups of 
countries take action. It discusses how action 
by the GEMs affects their own well-being 
through avoiding the worst consequences of cli-
mate change for their economies and societies.
•	 Section 3 considers the process of moving to 
a low-carbon economy and the opportunities 
for GEMs to build on their recent actions to 
trigger and win the low-carbon race, to improve 
their energy security and to establish cleaner, 
healthier and more productive societies.
•	 Annex A outlines the current importance of the 
GEMs to the global economy, their population 
and contribution to emissions, and how these 
are projected to grow substantially over the 21st 
century.
•	 Annex B provides more detail on the modelling 
analysis used in the report
This is the first of a series of reports that Vivid 
Economics is preparing for the Emerging Market Forum 
on the implications of climate change for the emerg-
ing economies. Subsequent reports will look in more 
detail at Brazil, India and China, examining the risks 
that climate change may pose to their economies, the 
challenges and opportunities that it presents to them in 
the context of their specific development paths, and the 
policy implications resulting from this. 
The economic and social impact of climate 
change on GEMs
This section develops and analyses three emissions 
scenarios, and deploys the MAGICC climate model 
much more familiar language, we contrast the GEMs, as defined above, with G20 Annex 1 
countries.
(discussed in Annex 2) to determine the impact of emis-
sions on Earth’s levels of atmospheric CO2, global mean 
temperature, and sea-levels. It draws out the implica-
tions of these scenarios for economic activity using the 
Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy 
2010 model (RICE 2010)6 and further models from the 
literature on the economics of climate change. 
While these models are among the best of their 
kind, there remains a high degree of uncertainty around 
specific estimates concerning the physical impacts and 
economic damages.7 In particular, RICE 2010, as with 
similar models, is calibrated to various ‘best estimates’ 
of relevant variables. However, for each of these vari-
ables there is a fair degree of uncertainty about what 
the ‘true’ value might be, leading to the possibility that 
both the physical impacts and resulting socio-economic 
consequences may be more benign or far worse than 
suggested by the modelling results reported in this 
paper.8 The report’s findings and conclusions must be 
considered in this context. 
The three scenarios are:
•	 A business-as-usual scenario, where the recent 
trends in emissions are projected forward on 
the basis of GDP forecasts provided by the 
Centennial Group to 2050 and from 2050-2100 
based on forecasts from the climate change 
modelling literature;
•	 A developed country action scenario in which 
developed countries commit to reduce emis-
sions by 80% on 1990 levels by 2050 (consist-
ent with the target set by the EU and very close 
to the target of the US);
6  Developed by Professor William Nordhaus at Yale University (Nordhaus and 
Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 2010 and the associated supplementary material).
7  Scientific understanding of the climate system continues to improve, but 
it remains unclear just how sensitive global mean temperature is to emissions forcings. 
Impacts on precipitation and wind speeds are also not yet fully understood, and there are 
further challenges in translating these physical changes into socio-economic impacts 
up to one hundred years into the future. These challenges in assessing socio-economic 
impacts are particularly acute in relation to large temperature increases.
8  This is compounded by that fact that many of these variables may have 
probability distributions that are ‘fat-tailed’ i.e. the probability that they imply catastrophic 


































































•	 A developed country plus GEM action scenario 
where, in addition to developed countries, 
GEMs also commit to ensuring that emissions 
(except from land use change) are at 2005 levels 
by 2050 (a potential proposal from China, as 
reported by the Sustainability Institute (2010)) 
and emissions from land use change fall by 50% 
on 2005 levels.
The analysis shows that for the GEMs to prosper in 
a world without dangerous climate change, they must 
take action — not because they are being urged to by 
others but simply because they will suffer the worst 
consequences of climate change if they fail to.
Business-as-usual
Our business-as-usual scenario is based on the recent 
historic relationship between GDP and emissions for 
each GEM/G20 Annex 1 country between 1990 and 
2005 taking into account improvements in this relation-
ship over this period. Centennial Group (2010) forecasts 
for economic growth to 2050 (as presented in Annex 1 
to this report) have been employed. We note that relative 
to other long-term macroeconomic forecasts, these 
forecasts assume higher rates of growth in GEM coun-
tries. For the period between 2050 and 2100, which are 
not covered by Centennial Group forecasts, we assume 
a steady decline in economic growth rates so that by 
the end of the century each country is growing at a rate 
equal to the relevant regional growth rate used in the 
Nordhaus RICE model.
In this scenario, results from MAGICC show that the 
world in 2100 will be substantially hotter: in the scenario 
developed, global mean temperatures are found to be 
4.9°C above 1990 levels.9 These temperature increases 
are associated with CO2 concentration levels of more 
than 900 ppm.
Temperature increases of 5°C would create 
extremely dangerous changes to the climate. Although, 
9  This is approximately 5.3°C above pre-industrial levels. See Annex 2 for a 
discussion on temperature increases between pre-industrial times and 1990.
the physical and social impacts in a 5°C+ world are 
highly uncertain, we do know that the last time tempera-
tures were this high — the Eocene period, 35-55 million 
years ago — swampy forests covered much of the world 
and there were alligators near the North Pole (Stern, 
2008). The global water cycle would be significantly 
altered, with billions of people experiencing either very 
much reduced or very much increased water supply 
compared to current conditions (Warren et al, 2006). The 
flow of rivers from the Himalayas, which serve countries 
accounting for around half the world’s current popula-
tion, would likely be disrupted (Stern, 2008). Ocean acid-
ity would rapidly approach a level not seen for hundreds 
of thousands of years, with severe, if not yet fully under-
stood, consequences for the natural regulation of ocean 
chemistry, marine ecosystems and commercial fisheries 
worldwide (Royal Society, 2005). 
Unsurprisingly, GEM economies will suffer signifi-
cantly in this world. Economic damage in the GEMs 
are estimated by the RICE model to be 6.0% of GDP 
by 2100.10 This, and all other damage estimates in the 
report, are reported before the impact of abatement 
but exclude any loss in GDP from sea level rises. In the 
same year, the modelling suggests that India might see 
economic damages of 7.0% of GDP; and China of 3.9%. 
As shown later in figure 4, the damages experienced 
by the GEMs, as a proportion of GDP, are greater than 
those experienced either by G20 Annex 1 countries or 
by the rest of the world.     
Looking behind these aggregate numbers, a 
number of sectors will bear the brunt of these impacts. 
Agriculture is one of the most sensitive economic sec-
tors to climate change, and is a relatively important 
sector in GEM countries currently accounting for about 
10  All of the damage estimates discussed in this report should be interpreted 
as meaning that the level of GDP in the stated year might be that percentage lower than 
if there were no increase in average global temperatures above pre-industrial levels. As 
the gap between pre-industrial temperatures and actual temperatures is expected to grow 
over time so this percentage loss will become larger the further into the future that dam-
age estimates are projected. In line with other reports we report the impact in one year, 
2100. In years before 2100, when temperature increases will be lower, the loss in GDP 
will be lower. In years after 2100, if global temperatures continue to rise, then the loss in 

































































10% of the GEM economy.11 Significant reductions in 
crop yields are expected in most GEM countries in the 
business-as-usual scenario. Figure 1 shows, based 
on analysis from World Bank (2010) and Muller et al. 
(2009)12 that, by 2050, dangerous climate change 
would be expected to lead to declines in agricultural 
yields in eight of the nine GEMs and that in the case 
of India, Argentina, South Korea, Brazil and Indonesia, 
these declines in yield could be greater than 15%. 
11  According to UN statistics, which group hunting, forestry and fishing with 
agriculture. However, agriculture forms the overwhelming bulk of economic activity within 
this group.
12  These results are calculated by applying the regional change in 2050 
yields expected in the A1B scenario as reported in Muller et al (2009) (which is consistent 
with our business-as-usual scenario, in that Muller et al assume temperature increases 
of 1.75ºC in 2046-2065 on 1980-1999 levels, while our business-as-usual scenario 
has  1.76ºC increases in 2050 on 1990 levels) to the country-specific results for yield 
changes, averaged across a range of future temperature scenarios, reported in the 
World Bank (2010). These results include some, but limited, adaptation (e.g. optimization 
amongst existing varieties) and do not assume significant technological progress. In addi-
tion, the possibility of higher concentrations of CO2 aiding plant growth (CO2 fertilisation) 
is not included on the basis that it remains controversial (see Muller, 2009). As such, 
these results should be interpreted as a worst case scenario, consistent with placing a 
high weight on precaution.    
China is expected to experience higher yields through 
more favourable climatic conditions, though the boost 
to Chinese yields is not sufficient to offset losses 
elsewhere.
A global temperature increase of 4.9°C may lead 
to sea-level rises of 0.51m by 2100. This sea-level rise 
will threaten a large number of GEM cities. For instance 
Nicholls et al (2007) list the cities most exposed to a 1 
in 100 year surge-induced flood event following a 0.5m 
increase in sea levels and with no further defence meas-
ures implemented. Impacts are measured in terms of 
future population exposure and future economic expo-
sure. As shown in the tables below, seven of the twenty 
most exposed cities are in the GEMs, with an expected 
exposed population of almost 50 million people in 2070. 
In terms of asset exposure, eight of the twenty (and six 
out of the top ten) most exposed cities are in the GEMs, 
with a combined expected asset exposure of USD 12.7 
trillion.
Source: Vivid Economics based on Muller et al (2009) and World Bank (2010). Per cent changes relative to a 2000 baseline.
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The health of GEM populations may also suffer from 
such high temperature increases. Predictive studies 
with results specific to GEM countries for far-future 
health impacts are rare, but an example is provided by 
Tanser et al. (2003), which estimates changes in malaria 
exposure in Africa by 2100. Results suggest that under a 
no-mitigation scenario, by 2100 South Africa would see 
the highest increases in malaria exposure in Africa, with 
a near five-fold increase in person-months of malaria 
exposure from 28 million person-months per annum to 
135 million. This would take it to a degree of exposure 
greater than present-day Ivory Coast or Cameroon.13 
Higher temperatures will cause reductions in biodi-
versity. The GLOBIO3 model of Alkemade et al. (2009) 
suggests that total biodiversity loss for the GEMs under 
business-as-usual will be equivalent to a cumulative 
loss of around 2,500,000 km2 of pristine habitat by 
2050 (compared to 1990). This is equivalent to an aver-
age loss of pristine land of 40,000 km2 per annum. For 
comparison, the equivalent decline in biodiversity from 
the loss of natural tropical forest during the 1990s is 
13  Although as the risk of malaria is very sensitive to income levels, this may 









Kolkata, India 14,014 Miami, USA 3,513
Mumbai, India 11,418 Guangzhou, China 3,357
Dhaka, Bangladesh 11,135 New York-Newark, USA 2,147
Guangzhou, China 10,333 Kolkata, India 1,961
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 9,216 Shanghai, China 1,771
Shanghai, China 5,451 Mumbai, India 1,698
Bangkok, Thailand 5,138 Tianjin, China 1,231
Rangoon, Myanmar 4,965 Tokyo, Japan 1,207
Miami, USA 4,795 Hong Kong, China 1,163
Hai Phong, Vietnam 4,711 Bangkok, Thailand 1,117
Alexandria, Egypt 4,375 Ningbo, China 1,073
Tianjin, China 3,790 New Orleans, USA 1,013
Khulna, Bangladesh 3,641 Osaka-Kobe, Japan 968
Ningbo, China 3,305 Amsterdam, Netherlands 843
Lagos, Nigeria 3,229 Rotterdam, Netherlands 825
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 3,110 Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 652
New York-Newark, USA 2,931 Nagoya, Japan 623
Tokyo, Japan 2,521 Qingdao, China 601
Jakarta, Indonesia 2,248 Virginia Beach, USA 581
Alexandria, Egypt 563
Source: Nicholls et al (2007)



































































estimated to have been around 150,000 km2 per year 
(Shvidenko et al., 2005). China and Brazil would be 
expected to experience more than 60% of these losses. 
Within China, the ecosystems most vulnerable to losses 
would be the North West and Tibetan Plateau, but with 
significant ecosystem damage also expected among 
the lower reaches of the Chiangjiang River basin and in 
South China (Wu et al, 2007). Within Brazil, the risks are 
concentrated in the Amazon rainforest and the Pantanal 
wetland, but the coral reefs along the Brazilian coastline 
are also considered to be vulnerable (La Rovere and 
Pereira, 2007).
Developed country action
In our second scenario, in which only Annex 1 countries 
take action, global warming will still be substantial. Even 
if Annex 1 countries reduce their emissions by 80% 
of 1990 levels by 205014 average global temperature 
increases of 4.4°C above 1990 levels (4.8°C above 
pre-industrial levels) may still result by 2100. This would 
be associated with CO2 atmospheric concentrations of 
780ppm. 
A world with this level of warming still implies a radi-
cal disruption to the physical and economic geography 
of Earth. While the current state of knowledge does not 
allow us to confidently predict how warming of 4-4.5ºC 
might differ from warming of 5ºC, a number of studies 
have identified likely physical impacts at around 4ºC.15 
For instance, it is estimated there would be a 40-50% 
decrease in annual water runoff in South Africa and 
South America, and at least a 20% increase in South 
Asia (Arnell, 2006). In semi-arid regions worldwide, the 
lack of rain would cause frequent wildfires, but particu-
larly in South America and Amazonia (Scholze, 2006). 
The most affected regions of the world would become 
too hot and dry to grow crops; for example, some 
models suggest that the flow of the Nile could decrease 
14  This, for instance, is the target that the EU has adopted.
15  Given the lack of a comprehensive assessment of physical impacts and 
what small differences between different high temperature increases might mean, the 
precise assumptions underlying these individual assessments may not be entirely consis-
tent.
by 75% (Strzepek, 2001). It is estimated that 1.5 billion 
more people would be exposed to dengue fever than in 
a world with no climate change (Hales, 2002).
Unsurprisingly, therefore, GEMs would still experi-
ence material economic losses. The RICE model sug-
gests that aggregate losses for all of the GEMs would 
be 5.1% of GDP in 2100. For China, losses might be 
as high as 3.2% of GDP and for India they could reach 
5.9% of GDP. These losses are, of course, lower than in 
the business-as-usual scenario but, strikingly, only by a 
small amount. Exclusive reliance on action by Annex 1 
countries only reduces the losses faced by the GEMs as 
a whole by 20 per cent (0.9 percentage points). These 
modest reductions in losses are shown in Figure 2.
With global temperature rises still substantial, 
potential losses from agricultural yields remain, for 
many GEMs, striking. As Figure 3 shows, even if Annex 
1 countries take action, climate change could lead to 
Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea still all fac-
ing yield declines of more than 15% in 2050.
Sea levels would still rise substantially, continuing to 
threaten many GEM cities. Action by Annex 1 countries 
is estimated to only reduce sea level rises in 2100 by 5 
centimetres (from 51cm to 46cm). 
Finally, the GEMs will still suffer from losses in biodi-
versity. The pristine area equivalent loss would fall only 
from 2.5 million km2 to 2.25 million km2. This is equiva-
lent to an average annual rate of 37,500 km2 per annum, 
still equal to 25% of the loss in biodiversity caused by 
tropical deforestation in the 1990s.  
Action by GEMS
At present, only the GEMs or the G20 Annex I countries, 
with their high emissions, have the scale to make a 
material impact on climate outcomes. Comparatively, 
GEMs have the greater incentive to act as the damages 
they will suffer without action are notably greater.
This unique combination of scale and incentive is 
illustrated in the two bubble charts below. These figures 
plot expected damages as a proportion of GDP in 2100 

































































Source: Vivid Economics using RICE (2010) and Centennial Group (2010)
Action by Annex 1 countries makes only a small difference to the 
economic damage from climate change suffered by GEMs 
Figure
2





BAU  Annex 1 action 
Damages as a % of 2100 GDP
Source: Vivid Economics based on Muller et al (2009) and World Bank (2010) 
Action by Annex 1 countries only makes a marginal difference to 
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the more damage climate change does to the economy. 
The vertical axis shows the scale of the emissions so 
that the higher up the chart the more material impact the 
region can have on global emissions. The bubble size is 
proportional to GDP. The first figure (Figure 4a) shows 
that even today GEMs are higher and further to the right 
than either of the other two regions. The second figure 
(Figure b) shows that, by 2050, under BAU and using 
Centennial Group (2010) forecasts, this effect is mas-
sively accentuated. 
Consistent with their high and growing emissions, 
the potential for GEMs to make a difference to global 
temperature increases is materially greater than for 
Annex 1 countries. Under a scenario in which action 
by Annex 1 countries to reduce emissions by 80 per 
cent on 1990 levels is matched by a commitment by 
the GEMs to ensure that: (i) general emissions in 2050 
are no higher than they were in 2005;16 and (ii) emissions 
from land use change are 50 per cent lower, then tem-
perature increases are much reduced. Compared to the 
business-as-usual increase of 4.9°C — and an increase 
of 4.4°C when only Annex 1 countries take action — glo-
bal temperature increases are 2.7°C (all on 1990 levels). 
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 in 2100 are 550ppm 
compared with 905ppm in the business-as-usual sce-
nario (and 780ppm in the Annex 1 action scenario).17 
The economic damage suffered by GEMs with these 
temperature increases is significantly smaller, although 
still not negligible. Economic losses in 2100 fall to 2.5% 
of GDP; for China and India losses are 1.5% and 3.0% of 
16  According to Sustainability Institute (2010), as of April 2010, this is a 
‘potential’ proposal of the Chinese government where potential proposals are defined to 
include conditional proposals, legislation under consideration, and unofficial government 
statements.
17  This is likely to underestimate the impact of GEM action on reducing emis-
sions as the premise of GEM action is to reduce fossil fuel imports, GEM action would 
have positive knock on effects on ROW emissions which our modelling does not capture.
Source: Vivid Economics based on RICE (2010) and Centennial Group (2010). Bubble size proportional to GDP
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GDP respectively. Figure 5 compares the losses faced 
by GEMs depending on the action taken. It clearly illus-
trates the importance of GEM action in diminishing the 
economic damage they might face.
The lower temperature increases resulting from GEM 
action are, for most GEMs, expected to result in a less 
damaging impact on agricultural yields. In Argentina and 
Brazil, where yield declines might be more than 15% if 
only Annex 1 countries take action, they may instead be 
only 5%. Declines in yields in India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
South Africa and Korea are also expected to be miti-
gated by concerted GEM action.
Sea level rises are much lower in this scenario. 
Compared to the sea level rises of 51cm in the business-
as-usual scenario — and which remain at 46cm in 
the developed country action case — increases are 
only 32cm when GEMs take action. In other words, 
while action by developed countries only generates a 
reduction in sea level rises of less than 10%, if coupled 
with GEM action then a reduction of more than 35% is 
possible.
Biodiversity losses are also curtailed. While action 
by Annex 1 countries only reduces the biodiversity loss 
suffered in the GEMs by 10%, complementary action by 
GEMs boosts this to more than 30%. 
It should be stressed that this scenario is not a 
recommendation for a 3°C temperature increase. The 
scientific evidence suggests that temperature increases 
above 2°C may be dangerous, and this position is rec-
ognised in the Copenhagen Accord. For instance, with 
warming of 3ºC the proportion of the global land surface 
experiencing severe droughts is still likely to increase 
from 10% today to up to 40% (Burke et al., 2006) while 
there will be a loss of glaciers in high altitude regions 
(including the Tibetan Plateau) affecting water supply 
to some heavily populated regions. Achieving a 2ºC 
increase is likely to require even more ambitious reduc-
tions from both Annex 1 countries and GEM countries 
than considered in this report, as well as action from 
the rest of the world. Reductions in line with 2°C are 
Source: Vivid Economics based on RICE (2010) and Centennial Group (2010). Bubble size proportional to GDP
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Source: Vivid Economics using RICE (2010) and Centennial Group (2010)









     
Damages as a % of 2100 GDP
BAU Annex 1 action Annex 1 + GEM action
Source: Vivid Economics using RICE (2010) and Centennial Group (2010)
Concerted GEM action will do much to reduce the negative impact of climate 
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technologically feasible, but involve significant political 
challenges.
Action by Brazil, China and India
A significant proportion of the benefits realised by GEM 
action derive from China, India and Brazil controlling 
their emissions. If these three countries alone took action 
alongside developed countries, as defined above, then 
global temperature increases in 2100 might be 3.5°C 
above 1990 levels. This compares with 4.4ºC without 
any GEM action and 2.7°C if all GEMs acted in a coor-
dinated fashion. In other words, these three countries 
alone account for around 50% of the temperature benefit 
that the GEMs can achieve collectively. In this scenario, 
sea levels might rise by around 38cm and atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 would be 640ppm. 
Correspondingly, action by these three countries 
can achieve important economic benefits. Compared 
with the developed country action scenario in which 
India suffers damages amounting to almost 6% of GDP 
in 2100 and China damages of 3.2% of GDP in 2100, 
action by these two countries and Brazil would reduce 
these losses to 4.2% and 2.2% respectively.  
Summary: Alternative visions of the future
If GEMs are to experience the strong growth projected in 
the Centennial Group forecasts then their action or inac-
tion on reducing emissions will determine whether or not 
the most dangerous changes in the world’s climate can 
be avoided. It will therefore determine whether or not 
the economic and social consequences of dangerous 
climate change on GEMs can be significantly reduced. 
This is summarised in Figures 7 and 8, which show 
the projected temperature increases and sea level rises 
in each of the three scenarios, and table 3 which further 
elaborates on the outcomes expected in each scenario.
Source: Vivid Economics modelling using MAGICC 5.3 and Centennial Group forecasts










































































country & GEM 
action
Average global temperature increase in 2100 (on 1990 levels), °C 4.9 4.4 2.7
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2, parts per million 905 780 550
Economic damages 
in 2100, % of GDP:
GEMs -6.0 -5.1 -2.5
India -7.0 -5.9 -3.0
China -3.9 -3.2 -1.5
Agricultural yield 
declines in 2050 
relative to 2000,%:
Argentina -19.8 -15.8 -6.2
Brazil -22.2 -18.5 -7.3
China 8.9 9.1 7.2
India -14.1 -11.4 -10.7
Indonesia -20.5 -19.9 -12.9
Mexico -0.7 -0.6 -0.2
Republic of Korea -18.5 -18.0 -11.7
South Africa -5.6 -5.8 -4.0
Turkey -0.7 0.3 -3.1
Sea level rise in 2100, cm above 1990 levels 50.5 45.6 32.1
Decline in biodiversity, km2 pristine area equivalent loss 1990-2050  2,509,000 2,253,000 1,754,000
Source: Vivid Economics based on sources in text
Action by GEM governments is essential if their countries are 
to avoid the worse consequences of climate change
Table   
3
Source: Vivid Economics and MAGICC 5.3 and Centennial Group forecasts 
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By making the low-carbon transition, GEMs will trans-
form their economies towards a new technological para-
digm. The evidence suggests that this will bring greater 
energy security, healthier and more productive citizens, 
cleaner cities, more productive agricultural sectors and 
more efficient and competitive industrial sectors. These 
benefits are in addition to avoiding the worst conse-
quences of climate change. 
GEMs are already taking action
Over the last 2-3 years, GEMs have accelerated their 
action on climate change and clean energy. China, for 
instance, is now one of the leading countries in the world 
in solar and wind, electric cars, and high-speed rail 
technologies. It is also the leading producer of solar pho-
tovoltaic cells, having dramatically gained market share 
from the United States.18 
GEMs are also becoming increasingly important 
locations for low-carbon innovation activity. As the figure 
below shows, since 2000, low-carbon energy patenting 
activity has accelerated rapidly within the GEMs. 
During the financial crisis, GEM countries led the 
world in the percentage of economic stimulus devoted to 
green measures. The economic stimulus plans of South 
Korea and China were judged to be 38% and 80% 
“green” respectively (HSBC, 2009), significantly greater 
than the US or the EU.
Two GEMs have already set emissions reduction 
targets in absolute terms, mirroring those in Annex 1. 
In November 2009, South Korea pledged to reduce its 
emissions by four percent below 2005 levels by 2020. In 
December 2008, Mexico announced that it will reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent of 2002 levels 
18  In 2004, the US accounted for 12% of solar PV production and China 3%; 
by 2009 Chinese production had risen to 35% and US production only 6%. Earth Policy 
Institute (2010)
Source: Dechezleprêtre et al (2011) and Vivid Economics calculations based on PATSTAT database
GEMs are responsible for a rapidly increasing amount of 
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by 2050. China and India will probably put a price on 
carbon before the US. In July 2010, it was reported that 
China will begin domestic carbon trading programs dur-
ing its twelfth five-year plan (2011-2015) to help it meet 
its target of reducing carbon intensity by 40-45% by 
2020. Furthermore, in the same month, India imposed 
a “domestic carbon tax”, in the form of a levy on coal 
producers, which is expected to raise around US $535 
million annually (BusinessWeek, 2010).
Accelerating action could trigger a low-carbon race 
that the GEMs should win
In the EU, countries and firms are seeking leadership 
in a “race to compete” in the low-carbon world. In July 
2010, a coalition of CEOs of large European companies 
wrote to support the ministers of the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France who are pushing for a 30% reduc-
tion in emissions by 2020. They argued that without 
such a target, “Europe might lose the race to compete in 
the low-carbon world to countries such as China, Japan 
and the US”.
The US President and some Democrat and 
Republican politicians, believe the USA must “win the 
clean energy race”. President Obama has stated that 
“the nation that leads the clean energy economy will be 
the nation that leads the global economy. And America 
must be that nation.” (State of the Union, 2010). To the 
disappointment of many in the USA, the structure of 
their legislature has made it impossible for them to pass 
significant clean energy legislation in 2010.
A large number of jobs are at stake. For instance, 
in the USA alone, it is estimated that investments of US 
$80 billion under the Recovery Act will generate over 
800,000 jobs in clean energy.19 
GEMs have a strong self-interested incentive to 
accelerate the race to a low-carbon global economy; 
they have the most to lose from a slow transition, and 
19  These comprise 722,000 jobs in renewable energy and advanced energy 
manufacturing (253,000 from direct government spending, and 469,000 from leveraged 
private investment), and 104,000 in smart grid investment. This does not include jobs 
from investments in advanced vehicles and batteries or energy efficiency. See White 
House (2009).
the most to gain from a fast transition. As well as reduc-
ing the climate damages GEMs may face, coordinated 
GEM action could trigger Annex 1 countries to ramp up 
their emission reductions, providing larger markets for 
GEM low-carbon products. For instance, a recent HSBC 
report predicted that if governments went beyond the 
commitments they made during the run up to COP 15 
then, even by 2020, the low-carbon market would be 
worth 2.7 trillion dollars; 30% larger than if governments 
simply kept to their COP 15 commitments and a massive 
100% larger than in their worst-case scenario (HSBC, 
2010). 
In the longer-term, they have an opportunity to dis-
rupt the economic and political status quo. Eras of rapid 
technological progress in core industries such as energy 
generation have sometimes driven major changes in the 
relative rankings of countries. For example, Great Britain 
leapfrogged The Netherlands in the eighteenth century 
due to being the first movers in the Industrial Revolution 
and the US overtook Great Britain in the late nineteenth 
century through the adoption of mass market production 
technologies. The GEMs already have a strong base 
from which to seize the clean energy opportunity as 
evidenced by the rapid increase in low-carbon energy 
system patenting activity within the GEMs. It is unsur-
prising that US and EU firms are increasingly fearful of 
the consequences if GEMs win the clean energy race. 
Delaying action increases costs
A recent survey of the literature on cost estimates 
derived from a wide range of integrated assessment 
models concluded that these models suggest that the 
global costs of meeting a 2ºC climate goal are likely to 
be between 1% and 5% of GDP (Bowen and Ranger, 
2009). There is little work to date on what the costs 
for GEMs specifically might be.20 The 2ºC goal is more 
ambitious than the scenarios that have been examined 
in this report which implies that the costs associated 
20  Although see section 3.5 below for some qualitative arguments for why it 

































































with realising the benefits discussed in this paper might 
be towards the lower end of this range.  In addition, 
these cost estimates should be seen in the context of 
the possibility that, as discussed at the start of section 
2, the damages might be much worse than suggested 
by most modelling assessments. In this light, the costs 
can be seen as an insurance policy against much more 
catastrophic damages than reported above. 
Moreover, costs increase with greater delay to 
action. Waiting until the future to take action will increase 
costs as it will lead to the accumulation of capital today 
that will be inconsistent with the requirements of a 
low-carbon world and which will have to be scrapped 
prematurely. Failure to accelerate support towards 
low-carbon innovation could slow the rate of technical 
progress in these clean technologies making an eventual 
switch to these technologies more costly (Acemoglu, 
2010). Two recent studies suggest that if the BRIC coun-
tries (as a subset of the GEMs) were to begin rational 
preparation for a low-carbon economy today they could 
save between 25% and 33% of the eventual costs of that 
transition (Bosetti et al, 2009; Blanford et al, 2009). 
Correspondingly, delay will require steeper annual 
reductions in order to reach the same goal. For instance 
if GEMs start taking action in 2012 to bring emissions 
back to 2005 levels by 2050 then they would have to 
achieve annual reductions in emissions of 0.4% per 
annum; if they wait until 2030 before starting to take 
action, with the intention of reaching the same target by 
2070, then average reductions of 1.5% per annum might 
be required. While historical experience shows that 
reductions of 0.5% per annum are achievable without 
significant economic consequences, reductions of more 
than 1.0% per annum have typically only been associ-
ated with prolonged economic recessions.       
Greater energy security
Many GEMs are currently reliant on significant imports of 
Note: not all imports in one year need be used for supply in that year, allowing imports to exceed 100% as in the case of Korea.
Source: IEA using latest available data (2009 for Mexico, Turkey and Korea; 2008 for all others). 


































































































































fossil fuels to meet their energy needs. Figure 10 shows 
that 6 of the 9 GEMs import more than 20% of their total 
energy needs. Six of the nine GEMs import more energy 
than they export.21 Dependency on imports for energy 
resources leads to concerns that energy supplies and 
prices may be vulnerable to uncontrollable events and/or 
political pressures in the exporting country.
Exploiting low-carbon energy sources offers the 
opportunity of reducing reliance on imported energy. 
The uneven geographic distribution of fossil fuel 
resources provides a relatively small number of countries 
with control of much of the world’s current energy 
supply. By contrast, the wide variety of different low-
carbon energy technologies (solar, wind, hydro, nuclear, 
biomass, geothermal) can provide much greater scope 
for domestic energy supply according to the prevailing 
conditions in each country.
Healthier, more productive and more efficient societies
The investments needed to achieve a low-carbon 
21  These are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Korea and Turkey.
transition will help make GEM societies cleaner, healthier 
and more productive.
Improved air quality
As well as carbon dioxide, fossil fuel combustion 
releases locally active air pollutants such as particulate 
matter, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide that are 
damaging to human health. These contribute to a range 
of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, including 
lung cancer, bronchitis and asthma. Particulate matter, 
small inhalable particles which can penetrate deep into 
the lungs, is considered particularly problematic.
Nine out of ten of the world’s cities with the worst air 
pollution are situated in the GEMs (Table 4). More than 
50 million people live in these cities. All of these cities 
have annual mean concentrations of PM10
22 that are five 
to eight times the WHO guideline level of 20 micrograms 
per cubic metre. Over half of the Chinese urban popula-
tion lives in cities with concentrations of PM10 over five 
times the guideline level. This level of exposure to PM10 
22  Particulate matter of 10 microns or less in size.
City PM10 concentration, 
(micrograms per m3) Population
Cairo, Egypt 169 7,764,000
Delhi, India 150 12,100,000
Kolkata, India 128 5,100,000
Tianjin, China 125 7,500,000
Chongqing, China 123 5,087,000
Kanpur, India 109 3,100,000
Lucknow, India 109 2,342,000
Jakarta, Indonesia 104 10,100,000
Shenyang, China 101 5,090,000
Zhengzhou, China 97 2,600,000
Source: World Bank (2007) World Development Indicators (Table 3.13), City Mayors statistics.
Bold indicates cities in GEM countries
Nine of the ten cities with the worst air pollution (in terms 



































































and other pollutants leads, according to World Bank 
(2007) estimates, to approximately 270,000 cases of 
chronic bronchitis and 400,000 hospital admissions 
from respiratory or cardiovascular disease in China each 
year, and the prematurity of up to 13 per cent of deaths 
amongst the Chinese urban population. The total cost 
of air pollution in China is placed at between 1.2% and 
3.8% of GDP.23
The health benefits of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions are considerable, substantially offsetting the 
costs of abatement. In the most polluted cities, including 
the health benefits of pollution reduction in cost-benefit 
analysis of many CO2 emissions reduction projects 
would make them cost-beneficial. In China, O’ Connor et 
al (2003) estimate that a tax that reduced emissions by 
15 per cent would yield health benefits of 0.14 per cent 
of GDP, offsetting two thirds of the loss in consumption 
from the tax.24 Combined with further benefits from 
increased agricultural productivity, these benefits can 
completely offset losses in consumption resulting from 
mitigation policies (see next section).
Increased agricultural productivity
Fossil fuel combustion leads to the formation of low-level 
ozone that damages crop yields by reducing photo-
synthesis and growth in plants. This is already affecting 
yields worldwide and, on the basis of current air quality 
legislation and trends in air pollution, an additional $6-10 
billion p.a. in crop yield losses is predicted in India and 
China by 2030 (Van Dingenen et al, 2009). Some of this 
could be avoided through mitigation action.
In China it is estimated that a 15% reduction in CO2 
emissions would increase national output of rice by 
0.29% (0.5 million tonnes) and wheat by 0.68% (0.8 mil-
lion tonnes) (O’ Connor et al, 2003). In monetary terms, 
the overall benefit of increased crop productivity in China 
is placed at 0.1% of GDP (20 billion 1997 yuan, or $3 
billion in 2008 $). In conjunction with the health benefits 
23  Depending on whether measured in terms of adjusted foregone earnings 
(the lower measure) or willingness to pay to avoid (the higher measure).
24  Assuming that the tax revenues are recycled.
reported above, this would more than offset the con-
sumption losses caused by the tax needed to reduce 
emissions by this amount. Further, these benefits do not 
include damage to crops through acid rain, which can 
also be significant. The World Bank (2007) estimated the 
economic cost of reduced crop yields due to acid rain in 
China at $3.6 billion (2003 prices) per annum.
Increased efficiency
Mitigation action can improve efficiency and save money 
over time, boosting GDP. Energy efficiency improves 
competitiveness, and the use of waste methane to 
generate electricity can lower costs. Such opportuni-
ties have not always been exploited because of market 
failures, including information gaps, savings accruing to 
parties other than those who bear the cost (for example, 
in property development), and other market failures (e.g. 
in the capital markets).
Annual savings through such costless mitigation 
measures could be greater than $100 billion per annum 
by 2030. Table 5 shows the estimates of potential sav-
ings in GEM countries, in absolute terms and as a per-
centage of GDP for four GEMs: China, Brazil, Indonesia 
and Mexico. 
Although these opportunities are unlikely, by 
themselves, to completely offset the overall costs of 
undertaking a low-carbon transition, they are yet another 
beneficial short-term side effect, and illustrate the value 



































































Country Metric Value of savings 
(USD, billion) % of current GDP
Annual emissions 
savings in year 
shown, MtCO2e
China Annual benefit in 
2030 53.5 1.2 ~1900
Brazil Annual benefit in 
2030 15.3 1.0 ~200
Indonesia Annual benefit in 
2020 1.9 0.4 ~180
Mexico NPV of benefit 
2009-2030 490 N/A N/A
Source: China and Brazil, McKinsey (2009) and (2009); Mexico, World Bank (2009); Indonesia Asian Development Bank (2009). All figures are in 
$2008.



































































Annex 1: A key influence on global emissions
This annex outlines the current importance of the GEMs 
to the global economy, their population and contribution 
to emissions, and how these are projected to grow sub-
stantially over the 21st century.
Today’s picture: growing in significance
The GEMs are already a major component of the global 
economic and political architecture. As figure A1 shows, 
three of the GEMs have economies of over $1 trillion 
GDP, while collectively the group accounts for almost a 
fifth of global economic activity. Over the period 2000-
2009, GEM countries averaged an annual economic 
growth rate (6.7%) almost four times that of the G20 
Annex 1 countries.25 Bilateral trade between China, 
Brazil and India increased by between 4 and 15 times, 
much greater than the increases in trade between these 
25  Weighted averages based on IMF data
countries and the United States.26 There are now twice 
as many Fortune Global 500 countries originating from 
GEM countries (74) as there were in only 2005. Such 
trends have justified the formation of the G20 itself, and 
it replacing the G7/G8 as the pre-eminent geopolitical 
forum. 
Almost half of the world’s population live in GEMs. 
Figure A2 shows that India and China alone each have 
a population bigger than that of the G20 Annex 1 coun-
tries put together.
GEMs have weathered the global economic reces-
sion better than more developed countries. Five out of 
nine GEMs (Argentina, China, India, Indonesia and South 
Korea) are thought to have enjoyed positive economic 
growth during 2009, compared to only one G20 Annex 
1 country (Australia).27 While the Global Credit Crisis 
led to a global drop in foreign direct investment of 22% 
26  International Trade Centre data
27  IMF data; some 2009 figures are based on estimates.
Source: IMF. * indicates IMF estimate
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in 2008, the GEMs saw an increase of 13%.28 Such 
consistently strong performance, and resilience under 
adverse economic conditions, suggests that the GEM 
countries will see their economic and geopolitical influ-
ence further increase over the coming decades
The major economic powers of tomorrow
GEMs will be a major driver of global population growth 
in the 21st century. According to the UN Population 
Division, by 2050, 0.6 billion more people will be living 
in the GEM countries, two-thirds of them will be in India. 
Figure A3 shows that, to 2050, GEMs will account for a 
quarter of the growth in world population, compared to 
just 2% in the most developed G20 countries.
On some forecasts, India and China will become 
the world’s economic superpowers. By 2050, the 
central scenario of Centennial Group International (2010) 
suggests that GEMs may account for more than 60% 
28  World Bank World Development Indicators
of global GDP and have accounted for more than two-
thirds of the economic growth between today and 2050. 
As shown in figure A4, their collective output could, in 
real terms, be 18 times the levels they are achieving 
today and four times current global economic output. 
India and China may be the world’s largest economies, 
each accounting for more than the entire economic 
output of G20 Annex 1 countries.
Current contributions to global emissions
The GEMs already account for just under half of global 
emissions. Commensurate with their rising economic 
status, the GEMs have become large emitters. They 
currently account for 43% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, a greater proportion than the G20 Annex 1 
countries (Figure A5). Symbolically, China has recently 
surpassed the United States as the world’s largest emit-
ter of carbon dioxide and largest energy consumer (IEA, 
2010).
Unsurprisingly given their recent rapid economic 
Source: World Bank
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Source: UN Population Division. 2010 figures are projections.
GEMs will be responsible for a quarter of the world’s 
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Source: Centennial Group International (2010)
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Source: (G20 Annex 1) UNFCC; (GEMs and Rest of World) World Resources Institute, projections from 2005 data
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Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
Three quarters of the growth in combustion related global 
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growth, GEM countries have accounted for the bulk of 
global growth in combustion CO2 emissions over recent 
years. Nearly three-quarters of global growth in fossil 
fuel-related CO2 over the period 2002-2007 was driven 
by GEM countries, with China alone contributing over 
half (Figure A6). More recent data is expected to further 
underline and confirm this trend. Just over half of China’s 
increase was attributable to the power sector, with the 
growth in industrial emissions also accounting for a 
significant proportion, although much of this was associ-
ated with the manufacture of goods exported to Annex 
1 countries.
Annex 2: The MAGICC model
The MAGICC model is a simple climate model, 
described as an “upwelling diffusion energy-balance 
model” which also incorporates a carbon cycle allowing 
for system feedbacks (Wigley and Raper, 2001). It is 
computationally fast, and can represent the output of 
more complex scientific models, making it suitable for 
this report. 
In our runs using MAGICC, we use a climate 
sensitivity parameter (which measures the change in 
temperature for a doubling of CO2) of 3ºC, based on 
the most recent IPCC report (Meehl et al., 2007) which 
concluded that “equilibrium climate sensitivity is likely to 
lie in the range 2–4.5°C, with a most likely value of about 
3°C.” For the ocean diffusivity parameter, a parameter of 
2.3cm2/s was used, broadly following Wigley (2005). For 
the carbon cycle component incorporating positive feed-
backs in the carbon cycle, we used the medium option 
provided by MAGICC.
MAGICC reports expected temperature increases 
relative to a 1990 baseline. Implicitly, there has been a 
0.4°C increase in global average temperatures between 
pre-industrial times and 1990. This is consistent with the 
IPCC 4th assessment report which provides a central 
case increase in global average temperature from pre-
industrial times to 2000-2005 of 0.8°C (within a range of 
0.6 - 1oC) and the results from Brohan et al (2006) – the 
most recent relevant study reported in the IPCC report 
– which estimates that the global average temperature 
increase per decade from 1979 to 2005 has been 
0.268°C. The Brohan et al (2006) results suggest that 
there was a 0.4°C between 1990 and 2005, implying a 
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?The Emerging Markets Forum was created by the Centennial Group as a not-for-pro￿t 
initiative to bring together high-level government and corporate leaders from around the 
world to engage in dialogue on the key economic, ￿nancial and social issues facing 
emerging market countries (EMCs).
 
The Forum is focused on some 70 emerging market economies in East and South Asia, 
Eurasia, Latin America and Africa that share prospects of superior economic performance, 
already have or seek to create a conducive business environment and are of near-term 
interest to private investors, both domestic and international. We expect our current list of 
EMCs to evolve over time, as countries’ policies and prospects change.     
Further details on the Forum and its meetings may be seen on our website at http://www.emergingmarketsforum.org
The Watergate O￿ce Building, 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 201
Washington, DC 20037, USA.  Tel:(1) 202 393 6663  Fax: (1) 202 393 6556
Email: info@emergingmarketsforum.org 
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